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Abstract
Typical personal medical data contains sensitive information about individuals. Storing or sharing the
personal medical data is thus often risky. For example, a short DNA sequence can provide information
that can not only identify an individual, but also his or her relatives. Nonetheless, most countries and
researchers agree on the necessity of collecting personal medical data. This stems from the fact that
medical data, including genomic data, are an indispensable resource for further research and development
regarding disease prevention and treatment. To prevent personal medical data from being misused,
techniques to reliably preserve sensitive information should be developed for real world application. In
this paper, we propose a framework called anonymized generative adversarial networks (AnomiGAN),
to improve the maintenance of privacy of personal medical data, while also maintaining high prediction
performance. We compared our method to state-of-the-art techniques and observed that our method
preserves the same level of privacy as differential privacy (DP), but had better prediction results. We also
observed that there is a trade-off between privacy and performance results depending on the degree of
preservation of the original data. Here, we provide a mathematical overview of our proposed model and
demonstrate its validation using UCI machine learning repository datasets in order to highlight its utility in
practice. Experimentally, our approach delivers a better performance compared to that of the DP approach.
Availability: Implementation is available at https://github.com/hobae/AnomiGAN/
Contact: sryoon@snu.ac.kr
1 Introduction
To restrain the use of personal data for illegal practices, the right to privacy
has been introduced and is being adaptively amended. The right to privacy
of medical data should be enforced because each individual’s genetic
information is static; therefore, a leak of such information would be very
dangerous. Genetic markers, which are short DNA sequences, constitute a
very sensitive piece of information. Using a genetic marker, it is feasible to
uniquely identify individuals and their relatives. If proper security toward
genetic information is not achieved, there is a risk of genetic discrimination
such as denial of insurance (e.g., denial of insurance) or blackmail (e.g.,
planting fake evidence at crime scenes) (Wagner and Eckhoff, 2018).
The advent of next-generation sequencing technology has progressed
DNA sequencing at an unprecedented rate, thereby enabling impressive
scientific achievements (Schuster, 2007). Using information gathered from
the Human Genome Project, an international effort has been made to
identify the hereditary component of the disease, which will allow for
earlier detection and more effective treatment strategies (Collins and
Mansoura, 2001).
Data sharing between medical institutions is essential for the
development of novel treatments for rare genetic diseases. Researchers are
capable of identifying similar occurrence patterns of certain rare diseases
on the basis of shared, more general data (Weir et al., 2004). Therefore,
seamless progress in genomic research largely depends on the ability
to share data among different institutions (Oprisanu and De Cristofaro,
2018). A public database GeneBank has been generated by international
contributors under and is known as the Human Genome Project. Various
institutions are responsible for collecting health and genetic data in several
countries. In the US, Research Program was launched to collect health and
genetic data in 2015. In the UK, Genomics England sequenced the genomes
of 100,000 patients with rare diseases and cancer, and the NIH’s Genomic
Data Commons (GDC) serves as a unified data repository from the cancer
research community (https://gdc.cancer.gov/).
© The Author 2019. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com 1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
11
31
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
1 J
an
 20
19
“manuscript” — 2019/2/1 — page 2 — #2
Patients portals and telehealth programs have gained popularity to
patients allowing them to interact with their healthcare system by online
health services (Crotty and Slack, 2016). Although these online health
services provide convenience since patients can order prescriptions at home
or remotely, patients are required to transmit their private data over the
Internet. Most health services follow the guidelines of accountability act
of 1996 (HIPPA1) to protect patient records, but these guidelines may not
be upheld when data is shared to a third party.
Online health services are extremely useful tools, but have introduced
vulnerabilities related to privacy issues. There are two significant privacy
threats involved in online health services: a) hijacking during transmission
and b) privacy leak on storage. To encourage the use of online health
services and the provision of sensitive genetic information, a strong
privacy shield should be guaranteed for all users and donors, both during
transmission and storage.
There are two approaches to improve protection of personal
medical data: 1) statistical-based anonymization and 2) encryption.
The statistical-based approach relies on strong assumptions of the
background population (Simmons and Sahinalp, 2019). Differential
privacy (DP) (Dwork, 2011) is a state-of-the-art method used to provide
strong privacy guarantees. In addition to DP, a number of methods have
been suggested to enable the sharing of aggregate personal medical data
while preserving participants privacy (Erlich and Narayanan, 2014; Homer
et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2011; Sankararaman et al., 2009; Simmons and
Berger, 2015). However, the first approach is limited to a few genomic
loci, which can lead to inaccuracies when the size of the genomic loci is
scaled up (Simmons and Berger, 2016; Simmons et al., 2016).
Second, cryptography-based methods (homomorphic encryption)
enables the computation of encrypted data via simple operations, such as
summation and multiplication. The property of homomorphic encryption
allows for sharing of personal medical data with accurate results.
However, the latency of the computation is in the order of hundreds of
seconds (Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016). In addition, a simple operation of
homomorphic properties limits adaptation to a complex model such as
neural networks (Bae et al., 2018).
As a number of deep learning-based disease prediction tools have been
developed and demonstrate outstanding prediction results (Min et al.,
2017), the deep learning techniques are extended to design privacy-
preserving deep neural networks (Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016; Hesamifard
et al., 2017; Sanyal et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2016). For example,
cryptoNets (Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016) apply neural networks to infer
encrypted data such as DNA sequences. However, the accuracy and
efficiency of this model are very low because the activation functions
are replaced by non-polynomial activation functions and the converted
precision of the weights (Bae et al., 2018). Recently, Sanyal et al. modified
CryptoNets in a way that allows for parallelization (Sanyal et al., 2018).
The first approach to privacy preserved sharing does not provide
a computational overhead, but this method has a significant trade-off
between privacy and accuracy. The second approach guarantees prediction
accuracy while preserving privacy, but contains a bottleneck for the server-
side computation-complexity. To address the aforementioned issues, we
propose a method based on generative adversarial networks (GANs) that
preserves similar prediction performance.
1 *The HIPAA statute that Genetic Data, by definition linked to an
identifiable person, should not be disclosed or made accessible to third
parties, in particular, employers, insurance companies, educational
institutions, or government agencies, except as required by law or with
the separate express consent of the person concerned.
1.1 Problem Statement
We focus on privacy issues related two types of adversaries that may be
encountered through the use of online health services: active and passive
adversaries. The active adversary will target an individuals private data
while users are interacting on the fly with the service, and the passive
adversary will target any information that is stored via online or offline
services. For the passive adversary, two major privacy issues may be
involved: a) a private leak occurring because of the level of security of
the service system, and b) upon patient’s consent for the use of their
medical information for the research purposes. The patients record may
be propagated to a third party with minimum anonymization following the
deidentification guideline (Berhane Russom, 2012).
1.2 Solution Intuition
Our proposed framework, AnomiGAN, allows a user to control the
anonymization level. For strong anonymization, one parameter that
controls the privacy level can be minimized to zero. Then, the model will
anonymize the data purely depending on a target classifier that guarantees
the same prediction results as those for original data while preserving
participant’s privacy.
AnomiGAN also provides functionality that mitigates the level
of confidentiality. This functionality can be used to ensure minimal
anonymity when sharing data between institutions that follow the same
privacy guidelines. The confidence level will depend on the δ acting like
the δ-differential privacy method (Dwork and Pottenger, 2013).
Unlike other deep neural networks, AnomiGAN’s design is a non-
deterministic model developed by adding variance which is estimated by
the parameters that are stored during the training process to the random
layer of the trained model.
1.3 Contributions
In this paper, we propose the anonymous generative adversarial networks
to protect an individual’s disease information from the institutions with the
ability to aggregate data among different institutions. Our framework is a
generic method that exploits a target classifier simulating prediction efforts
to preserve the original prediction result. We explore whether a generative
model can be constructed to produce meaningful synthetic data, which
simultaneously preserves original information while protecting private
disease information. We evaluated the proposed method on prediction
classifiers for two diseases (breast cancer, chronic kidney disease), and
found that prediction performance degradation is minimal compared to
the original prediction result. Finally, we compared our proposed method
to the state-of-the-art privacy preserving technique, and provide analysis
regarding privacy parameter and accuracy. Our analysis of the anonymous
generative adversarial networks reveals that the model becomes unstable
if the model employs a non-robust, target classifier.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following
section, we define entities, operations and adversary’s objectives. In
Section 3, we present a mathematical overview of our proposed model
with architecture. In Section 4, we present our experimental results and
compare with DP. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 5.
2 Background
We assume that the service providers use supervised machine learning
classifiers to make predictions on personal medical data. A machine
learning-based classifier attempts to find a function f that maps a medical
data points into either benign or malicious. Details of the target classifiers
are described in Section 4.3. In the following section, we define the goal
and capabilities of adversaries, and their associations to security bound.
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Fig. 1. The scenario of this study. The scenario consists of a trusted zone and an untrusted zone; the untrusted zone can be further divided into two groups. The first group is comprised
of online medical services, and the second group includes third parties (Google, Dropbox, and Amazon). User’s medical data is transferred to the online medical service and the services
provide diagnosis results to the user. Upon user consent for data sharing, the user’s data may be propagated to the third parties.
We provide preliminary security definition in Section 2.7 for the proof of
our model described in Section 3.2.
2.1 Scenario of Our Study
Fig. 1 illustrates the overall workflow of our study. The scenario consists
of a trusted zone and an untrusted zone. In the trusted zone, patients have
not involved any threats from an adversary. Within the untrusted zone, the
scenario assumes that two groups exist: a) one group that follows the health
insurance portability and accountability act of 1996 (HIPPA) guidelines
to protect patient’s records, and b) the group that follows guidelines
applicable to Cloud services, Google, Dropbox, Amazon, etc. Upon the
user’s consent for data sharing, the user’s data may be propagated to third
parties. Two possible types of adversaries exist when private information is
sent from the trusted zone to an untrusted zone for online health services.
Private information is a candidate target for an active adversary during
transmission, and any portion of an individual’s private information that
is stored is also a suitable target for a passive adversary. To prevent any
compromise of sensitive information, AnomiGAN can be deployed in the
trusted zone to anonymize personal medical data.
2.2 Adversarial Goal and Capabilities
It is important to define the capability of a particular adversary to measure a
relevant privacy aspect. The adversarial’ goal in our case is to compromise
an individual’s private medical data including any sensitive information.
An adversary can be anywhere in both online/offline health services, and
any third parties that closely work with medical institutions.
An adversary often makes an effort to estimate a posterior probability
distribution with the resources available for breaching privacy. The
available resources can be multiple combinations of computation power,
time, bandwidth, or physical nodes (Wagner and Eckhoff, 2018). The
adversary’s success probability can be quantified with the many trials
of adversary’s choice of input. The probability is then used to quantify
privacy, with low probability correlating to high privacy.
2.3 Security Bound
Modern cryptography introduces two relaxations to the notion of perfect
security (Lindell and Katz, 2014). The first notion limits the adversary to
the polynomial time adversaries indicating that security is only guaranteed
against polynomial-time adversaries. The second notion relaxes the
adversary’s success probability to allow for a small (negligible) advantage.
As such, we have designed our scheme as a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm, whereby the output of the model must have randomness to
prevent an adversary who repeated procedure with same input to observe
an information leak. We assume that adversary run in polynomial time
with additional negligible winning probability. For example, let A be an
algorithm that runs in polynomial time p(·) for every input x ∈ {0, 1}∗.
The computation of A(x) is then within at most p(|x|) steps. Note the
probabilistic algorithm is in the cryptographic system can be viewed as
having a capability of tossing coins. Tossing coins means that the algorithm
A has access to the random oracle such that each time of tossing coins will
independently equal to 1 with probability 1/2 and to 0 with probability
1/2.
2.4 Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et al., 2014) are
designed to solve other generative models by introducing a new concept
of adversarial learning between a generator and a discriminator instead
of maximizing a likelihood. The generator produces real-like samples by
transformation function mapping a prior distribution from latent space
into the data space. The discriminator acts as an adversary to distinguish
whether samples generates from the generator derive from the real data
distribution. Notably, the application of GANs has extended to various
fields of studies. For example, GANs have recently been employed in
cryptography and steganography (Baluja, 2017).
2.5 Differential Privacy
DP is a privacy-preserving model (Dwork, 2008) that guarantees to protect
individuals from privacy loss from an adversary. Intuitively, DP promises
that the probability of harm can be minimized by adding noise to the output
as follows:
M(D) = f(D) + τ (1)
whereM : D → R is a random function that takes a noise τ to the output,
D is the target database, and f is the deterministic original-query response.
Definition 2.1. (Differential Privacy). A random algorithm M with
domain N|D| is δ-differentially private if for all S ∈ Range(M) and
for all D, Dˆ ∈ N|D| such that D − Dˆ ≤ 1:
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(δ)Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] (2)
whereD andD′ are the absolute value of the privacy loss that is bounded
by δ with probability at least 1− δ (Dwork et al., 2014).
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the model presented in this study.
2.6 Notations
The notations used in this paper are as follows:
• x is the input.
• xˆ is the anonymized output given input x.
• E is an encryption function.E takes inputx and returns the encrypted
output E(x)→ xˆ.
• F is a random generator.F takes a seed k and returns a random output
string F (k)→ r
• M is a trained model.
• y is an output score given by the trained model M(x) → y given
input x.
• yˆ is an output score given by the trained model M(xˆ) → yˆ given
input xˆ.
• A is a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary. The adversary is an
attacker that queries input to the oracle model.
•  is the standard deviation value of score y.
• δ is a privacy parameter that controls confidence levels.
2.7 Threat Model
A random oracle model (Canetti et al., 2004) posits the randomly chosen
functionH , which can be evaluated only by querying an oracle that returns
H(x) given input x. The security of the random oracle is based on an
experiment involving an adversary A, as well as A’s indistinguishability
of the encryption. Assume that we have the random oracle that acts like a
current anonymous scheme E with only a negligible success probability.
The experiment can be defined for any encryption schemeE over input
space X and for adversaryA. The experiment is defined as follows:
(i) The random oracle chooses a random anonymous scheme E.
Scheme E modifies or extends the process of mapping a medical
data x with length n to transformed medical medical data xˆ as the
output. The process of mapping sequences can be considered as
a table that indicates for each possible input x the corresponding
output value xˆ.
(ii) AdversaryA then chooses a pair of medical data x0, x1 .
(iii) The random oracle selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends encrypted
medical data E(xb)→xˆ to the adversary.
(iv) The adversary outputs a bit b′.
(v) The output of the experiment is defined as 1 if b′ = b,
and 0 otherwise. A succeeds in the experiment in the case of
distinguishing xb.
With the experiment, the definition of perfect security for E takes the
following general form (Canetti et al., 2004):
Definition 2.2. The scheme E is perfectly secure over input space X if
for every adversaryA it satisfies
Pr[experiment of success] =
1
2
. (3)
In the encryption scheme E, A cannot distinguish between x0 and
x1. Furthermore,A obtains no information about the presence of a hidden
message. In the real world, most systems do not have access to a random
oracle. Thus, pseudorandom functions are typically applied by replacing
the random function (Canetti et al., 2004). With this assumption, the
oracle is replaced by a fixed encryption scheme E, which corresponds
to the transformation of a real system (implementation of the encryption
scheme). The implementation of a random oracle is deemed secure if the
probability of the success of a random oracle attack is negligible. Moreover,
the encryption schemeE is soundness secure if adversaryA has a success
probability such that
Pr[success] ≤ 1
2
+ . (4)
3 Methods
Our training involves three parties: an encoder, a discriminator, and a target
classifier (pre-trained discriminator). The encoder generates synthetic data
close to the form of input data, and the target classifier places a prediction
score of a synthetic data generated by the encoder. The discriminator then
generates a confidence score of whether a piece of data is a synthetic or
original data. The encoder is trained with random noise to learn to generate
a synthetic data such that the prediction result of a synthetic data from a
target model is same as the original data.
3.1 Anonymization using GANs
The architecture of this model is illustrated in Fig. 2. The encoder takes an
inputx and gives the output xˆ, which are given to both the discriminator and
the target classifier. The discriminator outputs the probability that x = xˆ,
given input xˆ. The target classifier outputs a prediction score given input
xˆ. The learning objective of the encoder is to minimize discriminator’s
probability to1/2 and maximize the prediction score of the target classifier.
The encoder accepts the n length of messages as input and generates
the n length of random strings, that are fed into the neural network. The
4
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probabilities from the logits (last fully connected layer). The target classifier takes an input xˆ and outputs the prediction score.
first layer consists of 64 filters with a length of 4; The second layer consists
of 32 filters with a length of 2; The third layer consists of 16 filters with
a length of 2. The fourth layer consists of 8 filters with a length of 2.
Additional layers are then additional layers are added in the reverse order
to the number of input length n. Batch normalization (Ioffe and Szegedy,
2015) is used at each layer and tanh (LeCun et al., 2012) is used as the
activation at each layer, except for the final layer where ReLU (Nair and
Hinton, 2010) is used for the activation function. The discriminator takes
the output of the encoder as an input to determine whether the output is real
or generated. A sigmoid activation function is used to output probabilities
from the logits.
To define the learning objective, let θE , θD1, and θD2 denote
parameters of the encoder, discriminator and target classifier. Let
E(θE , x, r, δ) be the output on x, D2(θD2, xˆ) be the output on xˆ,
and D1(θD1, x, E(θE , x, r, δ), θD2) be the output on x and xˆ. Let
LE , LD1, LD2 denote the loss of encoder, discriminator, and target
classifier. Let λe and λd denote the weight parameters for the encoder, the
discriminators. The parameter λe can be used to control anonymization
level. For strong anonymization level, the parameter λe can be the
minimum value. The encoder then has following objective functions:
LE(θE , x, r, δ) = λe · d(x,E(θE , x, r, δ)) + λd · (LD1 + LD2)
= λe · (d(x, xˆ) + δ) + λd · (LD1 + LD2)
(5)
where d(x, xˆ) is the Euclidean distance between synthetic and original
data and δ controls confidence level. A discriminator has the sigmoid
cross entropy loss of:
LD1(θE , θD1, θD2, x, xˆ) =− y · log(E(θE , p))
− (1− y) · log(1− E(θE , p)),
(6)
where y = 0 if p = xˆ and y = 1 if p = x, where p is the score of given
input x and xˆ. A target classifier has a classification score of:
LD2(θD2, xˆ) = C(f(xˆ)), (7)
where C(f) is a cost function of pre-defined classifier.
3.2 Security Principle of Anonymized GANs
In this section, we show that the AnomiGAN has a scheme that is
indistinguishable for an adversary. The AnomiGAN has a similar structure
to the one-time pad encryption scheme, except that a probabilistic model
is used to generate the output of the one-time pad. Since a probabilistic
model generates a pseudorandom output that appears to be random
any polynomial-time adversary, the AnomiGAN can be demonstrated
as computationally-secure. A simple intuition of the indistinguishable
scheme is that the adversary is allowed to choose from multiple data from
the synthesized data. An adversary can freely interact with an encryption
oracle, which is regarded as a black-box that anonymize data chosen by
the adversary. For the AnomiGAN, synthesized data can be viewed as
encrypted data. Formally, we have constructed as input a seedk ∈ {0, 1}n
and a medical record x ∈ {0, 1}n, where r ← {0, 1}n is chosen
uniformly at random and outputs the synthesized data. We define our
anonymization scheme as follows for medical record length n:
• Select k ← {0, 1}n and outputs the seed.
• On input a seedk, pseudorandom generatorF outputs a random string
F (k)→ r.
• AnomiGAN: on the input a random string r, and a medical record x,
the model M output the synthesized medical record
xˆ =M(r ⊕ x). (8)
A random r is replaced for each learning steps, and the variances of
each layer are stored during the learning process. The variance of each
layer is added to randomly selected layers in inference time to ensure
that the generator does not produce the same output from the same input.
Intuitively, a generative model is a probabilistic model; thus M(r ⊕ x)
appears completely random to an adversary who observes a medical record
xˆ given x operating similarly to the one-time pad. Note that similar
operations can be expected upon the replacement of⊕ to (r× x) mod n.
Theorem 3.1. If F (k) is a pseudorandom generator and M is a
probabilistic model, then M has a scheme that is indistinguishable to
an adversary.
Proof. The rationale for the proof is that if M is a probabilistic and
the F (k) is the pseudorandom generator; then the resulting scheme is
identical to the one-time pad encryption scheme hold a Definition 2.2. We
know that r has the same length of x and the output length of xˆ is also
equal to both r and x. The same length of r, x, and xˆ with the operation
of r ⊕ x is identical to the one-time pad encryption scheme, which has
5
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Fig. 4. Learning performance of AnomiGAN. (a) Loss of encoder and discriminator for breast cancer dataset. (b) Loss of encoder and discriminator for chronic kidney disease dataset.
a formal Definition 2.2. Let polynomial-time adversary A constructs a
distinguisher for F (k) such thatA has the success probability as defined
in Equation 10. The distinguisher is given an input x, and the goal is
to determine whether x is a truly random or x is generated by M. The
distinguisher emulates the experiment described in Section 2.7, and the
distinguisher has two observations. If input x is truly random, then the
distinguisher has a success probability of:
Pr[F (k) of success] =
1
2
, (9)
which follows Equation 2.2. If input x is equal to c = M(F (k) ⊕ x),
wherek is chosen at uniformly random, then the distinguisher has a success
probability of:
Pr[M(F (k)⊕ x) of success] ≤ 1
2
+ . (10)
By the assumption that F (k) is a pseudorandom generator and M is a
probabilistic, then  must be negligible.
4 Results
4.1 Experimental Environment
We performed experiments using Ubuntu 14.04 (3.5GHz Intel i7-5930K
and GTX Titan X Maxwell(12GB)). For the implementation, we exploited
the Scikit-learn library package (version 0.18) for convolutional neural
networks, the Keras library package (version 2.0.6) for neural networks,
tensorflow (1.11.0) for generative adversarial networks, and bio-python
(1.72) used for input representation.
4.2 Datasets
We simulated our approach using the Wisconsin breast cancer dataset
from the UCI machine learning repository (Blake, 1998), and the chronic
kidney disease dataset from the UCI machine learning repository (Rubini
and Eswaran, 2015). The Wisconsin breast cancer and chronic kidney
disease datasets consist of 30 and 24 features, respectively. The datasets are
randomly partitioned to training and test sets of 90% and 10%, respectively.
4.3 Target Classifiers
Many services are incorporate disease classifiers using machine learning
techniques. For our experiment, we selected breast cancer and chronic
kidney disease model from the kaggle competitions as the target classifiers.
The classifiers will be used as black-box access to our target classifier in our
method. We selected these classifiers for two reasons: a) both classifiers
achieve high accuracy in disease detection to their testing datasets, and
b) these classifiers are open source implementations, which allows easily
accessible as our target classifier.
4.4 Model Training
For the training model, we used optimizer of multi-class logarithmic loss
function Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2014) with a learning rate of 0.001, a beta
rate of 0.5, the epoch of 50000, and mini-batch size of 10. The objective
function LE that must to be minimized as described in Eq (5). Most of
these parameters and networks structure were experimentally determined
to achieve optimal performance. Fig. 4 show the training loss of each
model. For the breast cancer dataset, the discriminator achieves the optimal
loss after 3000 steps, while the encoder requires more steps to generate
original data like the sample. For the chronic kidney disease dataset, the
optimal loss achieved after 10,000 steps.
4.5 Evaluation Process
We exploited DP, in particular, the Laplacian mechanism (Dwork and
Pottenger, 2013), to compare the anonymization performance against
corresponding accuracy and AUC. For the evaluation metric, the accuracy2
and the AUC are used to measure performance between original samples
and anonymized samples according to the model’s parameter changes. The
correlation coefficient is used to measure the linear relationship between
the original samples and anonymized samples by changing the privacy
parameters. We generated the anonymized data according to privacy
parameter δ and λe by randomly selecting 1000 cases, and obtained the
average prediction of accuracy, AUC, and correlation coefficient against
corresponding original data. In the next step, we fixed test data and
generated anonymized data to validate the probabilistic behavior of our
model. As shown in Table 1, a variance of each encoder layers is added to
the corresponding encoder layers in the inference time. The process was
repeated 1000 times with the fixed test data.
4.6 Comparison to Differential Privacy
DP achieves plausible privacy by adding Laplacian noise Lap(λ) =
Lap(S/δ) to a statistics (Dwork and Pottenger, 2013). The parameter
λ = .1 has a minimal effect on privacy and the risk of privacy increases
as the parameter λ increases. The amount of noise presents a trade-off
between accuracy and privacy. Note that standard DP of unbounded noise
version of Laplacian was applied for the experiments.
2 Accuracy = (TP + TN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN), where TP ,
FP , FN , andTN represent the numbers of true positives, false positives,
false negatives, and true negatives, respectively.
6
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Fig. 5. Anonymization performance using a breast cancer dataset: a fixed test dataset was selected from the UCI machine learning repository. The correlation coefficient, accuracy, and
AUC were measured by changing 0.1 of the privacy parameter for fixed test data, δ.
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Fig. 6. Anonymization performance using a chronic kidney dataset: a fixed test dataset was selected from the UCI machine learning repository. The correlation coefficient, accuracy, and
AUC were measured by changing 0.1 of the privacy parameter for fixed test data, δ.
Fig. 5 shows an experiment for our proposed algorithm and DP
algorithm using a fixed breast cancer tests. The experiments were
conducted by increasing 0.1 of the parameter λ. DP showed good
performance in the coefficient correlation but showed a significant drop in
both accuracy and AUC. However, our proposed methodology showed that
coefficient correlation does drops slowly, but maintains good performance
in accuracy and AUC.
Fig. 6 shows an experiment for our proposed algorithm and DP
algorithm with respect to kidney disease tests. Similar behavior was
observed for the breast cancer dataset, but the coefficient correlation did not
degrade after λ = 0.3. In the case of AnomiGAN, we noticed from Fig. 5
that coefficient correlation only drops until certain level due to additional
loss from discriminator as described in Equation 5.
Fig. 7 details features and its correlation. Fig. 7 (a) shows the feature
correlation of breast cancer, and Fig. 7 (2) shows the feature correlation
of chronic kidney disease. In the case of DP, we noticed that trade-off
between privacy and accuracy are more strongly correlated if the features
are strongly correlated with each other.
4.7 Performance Comparison
We evaluated the performance of our proposed method based on two
classifiers (breast cancer, chronic kidney disease) to measure prediction
performance and coefficient values between original data and anonymized
data. The experiments were conducted by changing 0.1 of the privacy
parametersλe, and δ. Fig. 8 shows an experiment for privacy parameterλe.
The term λe is directly associated with the Euclidean distance indicating
Table 1. Performance results of the model upon adding variance to the layer.
Layer1 Layer2 Layer3 Layer4 Layer5 Layer6 Layer7
(Breast cancer)
Correlation coefficient 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.86
Accuracy (%) 88.00 90.83 88.33 91.67 85.83 91.67 90.00
ACU 0.864 0.916 0.858 0.906 0.931 0.921 0.906
(Chronic kidney disease)
Correlation coefficient 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.86
Accuracy (%) 96.70 100 100 100 100 100 100
ACU 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
that the privacy level should be decreased as λe increases. As shown in
Fig. 8 (a) the coefficient correlation value indicates that strong association
between original and anonymized data as the parameter λe is increased
for both datasets. Fig. 8 (b) and (c) indicate that the averaged accuracy and
AUC does not degrade as the parameter λe is increased. This is expected
behavior, as λd is proportional to λe, maximizing the discriminator loss
to a target classifier.
To validate the probabilistic behavior of our model with respect to
variance added for each layer, we measured the mean of the coefficient
correlation for each of the 7 encoder layers as shown in Table 1. The
results indicate that adding variance to each of layers has a difference in
the coefficient correlation with limited effects on both accuracy and AUC.
Table 2 shows the training and running time for each datasets. The
training time varied depending on the hyperparameters. The training
time was measured with the optimal hyperparameters. The loss weight
parameters of λe and λd are set to 0.5, and the privacy parameter δ was set
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(a) (b)
Fig. 7. Feature correlation (best viewed in color). Correlations between features of breast cancer (a) and chronic kidney disease datasets (b).
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Fig. 8. Comparison of privacy parameter λe . The correlation coefficient, accuracy, and AUC are measured by changing 0.1 of the privacy parameter λe for fixed test data.
Table 2. Training and running time of the proposed method based for two
classifiers.
Dataset No. of features Training Time (Hours) Running Time (Secs)
Breast cancer 30 2≤ 1.00≤
Chronic kidney disease 24 1≤ 1.00≤
to 0.3. The training time includes the operation of measuring the variance
of each layer which is then used at running time.
5 Discussion
Here, we have introduced a novel approach for anonymizing private
data while preserving the original prediction accuracy. We showed that
under a certain level of privacy parameters, our approach preserves
privacy while maintaining a better performance of accuracy and AUC
compared to the differential privacy. Moreover, we provide a mathematical
overview showing that our model is secure against an efficient adversary,
demonstrating that the estimated behavior of the model, and finally
evaluated the performance compared to the state-of-the-art privacy
preserving method.
One of our primary motivations for this study was that many companies
are providing new services based on deep neural networks, and we
believe this will extend to online medical services. Potential risks
regarding the security of medical information (including genomic data)
are higher compared to the current risks to private information security,
as demonstrated by Facebook’s recent privacy scandal. In addition, it is
difficult to notice a privacy breach even when there are privacy policies
in place. For example, when a patient consents to the use of medical
diagnostic techniques, the propagation of that information to a third party
cannot guarantee that the same privacy policies will be adhered to by
them. Finally, machine learning as a service (MLaaS) is mostly provided
by Google, Microsoft, or Amazon due to hardware constraints, and it
is even more challenging to maintain user data privacy when using such
services.
Exploiting traditional security in the deep learning requires encryption
and decryption phases, which make its use impractical in the real world
due to a vast amount of computation complexity. As a result, other
privacy preserving techniques such as DP will be exploited in deep
learning. Towards this objective, we developed a new approach of privacy-
preserving technique based on deep learning. Our method is not limited to
the medical data. Our framework can be extended in many various ways
to the concept of exploiting a target classifier as a discriminator.
Unlike a statistics-based approach, our method does not require a
background population to achieve good prediction results. AnomiGAN
also provides the ability to share data while minimizing privacy risks.
We believe that online medical services using the deep neural network
technology will be available in our daily lives, and it will no longer
be possible to overlook issues regarding the privacy of medical data.
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We believe that our methodology will encourage the anonymization of
personal medical data. As part of future studies, we plan to extend our
model to genomic data. The continuous investigation of privacy in medical
data will benefit human health and enable the development of various
diagnostic tools for early disease detection.
References
Bae, H., et al. (2018). Security and Privacy Issues in Deep Learning. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1807.11655.
Baluja, S. (2017). Hiding images in plain sight: Deep steganography. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 2069–2079.
Berhane Russom, M. (2012). Concepts of Privacy at the Intersection of
Technology and Law. Ph.D. thesis.
Blake, C. (1998). UCI repository of machine learning databases.
http://www. ics. uci. edu/˜ mlearn/MLRepository. html.
Canetti, R., et al. (2004). The random oracle methodology, revisited.
Journal of the ACM (JACM), 51(4), 557–594.
Collins, F. S. et al. (2001). The human genome project: revealing the shared
inheritance of all humankind. Cancer: Interdisciplinary International
Journal of the American Cancer Society, 91(S1), 221–225.
Crotty, B. H. et al. (2016). Designing online health services for patients.
Israel journal of health policy research, 5(1), 22.
Dwork, C. (2008). Differential privacy: A survey of results. In
International Conference on Theory and Applications of Models of
Computation, pages 1–19. Springer.
Dwork, C. (2011). Differential privacy. In Encyclopedia of Cryptography
and Security, pages 338–340. Springer.
Dwork, C. et al. (2013). Toward practicing privacy. Journal of the
American Medical Informatics Association, 20(1), 102–108.
Dwork, C., et al. (2014). The algorithmic foundations of differential
privacy. Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science,
9(3–4), 211–407.
Erlich, Y. et al. (2014). Routes for breaching and protecting genetic privacy.
Nature Reviews Genetics, 15(6), 409.
Gilad-Bachrach, R., et al. (2016). Cryptonets: Applying neural networks
to encrypted data with high throughput and accuracy. In International
Conference on Machine Learning, pages 201–210.
Goodfellow, I., et al. (2014). Generative adversarial nets. In Advances in
neural information processing systems, pages 2672–2680.
Hesamifard, E., et al. (2017). CryptoDL: Deep Neural Networks over
Encrypted Data. arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.05189.
Homer, N., et al. (2008). Resolving individuals contributing trace amounts
of DNA to highly complex mixtures using high-density SNP genotyping
microarrays. PLoS genetics, 4(8), e1000167.
Ioffe, S. et al. (2015). Batch normalization: Accelerating deep
network training by reducing internal covariate shift. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1502.03167.
Kim, J., et al. (2016). Collaborative analytics for data silos. In Data
Engineering (ICDE), 2016 IEEE 32nd International Conference on,
pages 743–754. IEEE.
Kingma, D. et al. (2014). Adam: A method for stochastic optimization.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6980.
LeCun, Y. A., et al. (2012). Efficient backprop. In Neural networks: Tricks
of the trade, pages 9–48. Springer.
Lindell, Y. et al. (2014). Introduction to modern cryptography. Chapman
and Hall/CRC.
Min, S., et al. (2017). Deep learning in bioinformatics. Briefings in
bioinformatics, 18(5), 851–869.
Nair, V. et al. (2010). Rectified linear units improve restricted boltzmann
machines. In Proceedings of the 27th international conference on
machine learning (ICML-10), pages 807–814.
Oprisanu, B. et al. (2018). AnoniMME: Bringing Anonymity to the
Matchmaker Exchange Platform for Rare Disease Gene Discovery.
bioRxiv, page 262295.
Rubini, L. J. et al. (2015). Generating comparative analysis of early stage
prediction of Chronic Kidney Disease. International Journal of Modern
Engineering Research (IJMER), 5(7), 49–55.
Sankararaman, S., et al. (2009). Genomic privacy and limits of individual
detection in a pool. Nature genetics, 41(9), 965.
Sanyal, A., et al. (2018). TAPAS: Tricks to Accelerate (encrypted)
Prediction As a Service. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.03461.
Schuster, S. C. (2007). Next-generation sequencing transforms today’s
biology. Nature methods, 5(1), 16.
Simmons, Sean, B. B. et al. (2019). Protecting Genomic Data Privacy with
Probabilistic Modeling. Proceedings of the 24th Pacific Symposium on
Biocomputing.
Simmons, S. et al. (2015). One size doesnâŁ™t fit all: measuring
individual privacy in aggregate genomic data. In Proceedings. IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy. Workshops, volume 2015, page 41.
NIH Public Access.
Simmons, S. et al. (2016). Realizing privacy preserving genome-wide
association studies. Bioinformatics, 32(9), 1293–1300.
Simmons, S., et al. (2016). Enabling privacy-preserving GWASs in
heterogeneous human populations. Cell systems, 3(1), 54–61.
Wagner, I. et al. (2018). Technical privacy metrics: a systematic survey.
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 51(3), 57.
Weir, R. F., et al. (2004). The stored tissue issue: Biomedical research,
ethics, and law in the era of genomic medicine. Oxford University Press.
Zhou, X., et al. (2011). To release or not to release: evaluating information
leaks in aggregate human-genome data. In European Symposium on
Research in Computer Security, pages 607–627. Springer.
9
